Lee. Mem, of Conv

DEPARTMENT OF STATE Executive Secretariat February 12, 1959

Downsonded to: SECONT CONTROL 4

ED 100 2: August 1 2 6 4

August 1, 176 17017

S/S-RO - Mr. Dunnigan

Secretary's Conversation with General Norstad

For approval of distribution.

Mr. Greene has already approved the texts.

Memorandum of Conclusions to White House Conference re Berlin	Tab	A
Tripartitism	Tab	В
Naval Command Question	Tab	С
Integrated Air Defense	Tab	D
Atomic Stockpile	Tab	E
German Atomic Question	Tab	F
IRBMs for Greece and Turkey	Tab	G
Berlin	Tab	H

James Carson

SVE/MD-2

DATE: February 4, 1959

Time: 3:00 P.M.

Place: Embassy Residence,

London

SUBJECT:

Memorandum of Conclusions to White House

Conference Re Berlin

PARTICIPANTS:

Secretary Dulles

General Norstad

Ambassador Whitney

Mr. Livingston Merchant

Minister Barbour

Mr. Joseph N. Greene, Jr.

Mr. Raymond Thurston

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand

COPIES TO:

s/s - 2 e

We C

cel,

S/P C C

H- Show only - to 5131 8/12/59

Dist Made 3/12/59.

After reading the "Memorandum of Conclusions to White House Conference Re Berlin", General Norstad said he thought the UK and France could accept the plan of action proposed. He believed that the Western powers had to be firm but deliberate. All possibility of misconception should be avoided by letting the Soviets know precisely what we were thinking. His concern about the old paragraph 4D had been that it contemplated taking the ultimate action too fast.

In response to Mr. Thurston's question as to whether the first convoy, assuming it got through, should be followed by others, the Secretary said it would seem a good idea to continue sending through convoys until some sort of a pattern were established, perhaps for a period of two weeks or so.

___ SANITIZED COPY

SENSITIVE INFORMATION DELETED

STATE

On Strategy

TOP SECRET

SANITIZED COPY
SENSITIVE INFORMATION DELETED

(b)(i)2 - STATE

The Secretary mentioned that a new paper had been received yesterday from the JCS, filling in some of the paragraphs in the Memorandum of Conclusions.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

SVE/MC-3

DATE: February 4, 1959

Time: 3:00 p.m.

Place: Emb.Residence, London

SUBJECT:

Tripartitism

The Secretary

General Norstad

PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Whitney

Mr. Merchant Mr. Barbour Mr. Greene Mr. Thurston

Mr. Hillenbrand

s/P

COPIES TO:

s/s - 2 INR EUR W G WE Amembassy Paris C H

General Norstad said he had seen Debre on Friday, January 30. Nothing much of consequence had been said, but the Premier had emphasized France's global interests. He made one interesting statement to the effect that if one believed that NATO was everything, and one must so believe, then one must have an understanding on a broader basis as well. General Norstad made the point, which he reiterated several times subsequently, that the attitude of General de Gaulle had appeared to change during the last several weeks. Up to that time he had become progressively more anti-American in his attitude and remarks, but recently he has seemed to mellow somewhat.

General Norstad commented that Ambassador Alphand in Washington was probably sending somewhat too optimistic reports to General de Gaulle regarding the development of tripartitism. Apparently he had indicated that the door was left slightly open relative to military planning. The Secretary commented that he had told Alphand that the door was wide open, but it did not lead anywhere. He had made the point that, if it were desired to know American policies, the French should talk to the Secretary, since political decisions were made by the responsible political officers of the government and not by the military commanders.

General Norstad said he thought that participation by JCS representatives in the tripartite meetings in Washington was a bad thing. If they so desire, the British and French could send their military representatives. Mr. Merchant commented that it was Mr. Murphy's understanding the JCS would produce an officer for spot advice, but he thought the position was preserved that this did not 6 constitute a precedent.


General Norstad

140.5/2.459



General Norstad said that de Gaulle was interested primarily in "global atomic strategy". The Secretary noted that, at the December meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council, he had remarked that we have this nuclear power and consider it a trust. If any country wished to know when we intend to use it, they had only to ask, but such discussion must be in advance. General Norstad said that de Gaulle has taken the position he wants to discuss situations that might lead to war - for example, Middle Eastern problems. He thought that the General was gradually reconciling himself to the American position. We should not allow ourselves to get into a situation where military representatives of the three countries were sitting down and planning on a global basis.

In response to the Secretary's query as to what the French understood by "military participation", General Norstad indicated that they did not know what they wanted. It was advisable not to squeeze de Gaulle on this subject, and he would probably not squeeze in return. He had the impression that the French in Paris knew that Alphand's reporting was not too reliable.



SVE/MC-4

DATE: February 4, 1959

Time: 3:00 p.m.

Place: Emb.Residence, London

SUBJECT:

Naval Command Question

The Secretary

General Norstad

PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Whitney

Mr. Merchant
Mr. Barbour
Mr. Greene
Mr. Thurston

Mr. Hillenbrand

COPIES TO:

S/S - 2 EUR
W RA
G Paris for Embassy
C and USRO

S/P

Dust Marce 3/18/59

General Norstad suggested that de Gaulle, in any conversation with the Secretary, might raise the question of the French navy with which he seemed to be prepared. He appeared to have a sort of sentimental attachment to the subject, dating from the scuttling of the French Fleet at Toulon. He might bring up the question of removing the Mediterranean area from the NATO command, putting it under a sort of AfMed. General Norstad commented that Ambassador Alphand was probably free-wheeling when he suggested that what the French wanted was to take their Mediterranean Fleet out of NATO in the same sense that the 6th Fleet was not under NATO command. General Norstad suggested that, if de Gaulle raised the matter, the Secretary follow the line that this is a NATO question, which would be hard to discuss without specific proposals. General Norstad had told Debre that he would consider any such proposals when made.

The Secretary commented that President Eisenhower felt that the 6th Fleet should actually be more under NATO command than it was. General Norstad said that if all the French want is to have their fleet have the same status as the 6th Fleet, that did not present a great problem. In a practical sense that is already its status, but they did not appear to appreciate this.

(Drafting Office and Officer)

-TOP-SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

SVE/MC-5

DATE: February 4, 1959

Time: 3:00 p.m.

Place: Emb.Residence, London

SUBJECT:

Integrated Air Defense

The Secretary

General Norstad

PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Whitney

Mr. Merchant Mr. Barbour Mr. Greene

Mr. Thurston

Mr. Hillenbrand

COPIES TO:


S/S - 2

W
EUR
G
RA
C
Paris for Embassy


C Pa S/P

The subject of NATO integrated air defense had been discussed in the North Atlantic Council this morning. The French had made a counter-proposal to the Stikker proposal. The latter had been satisfactory to General Norstad. It was really a 14-to-1 situation in the Council, with the French in an isolated position. There could be no real air defense without integration under present conditions. The French were holding out to achieve their purpose of making progress in tripartite talks in Washington.

and USRO



(Drafting Office and Officer)



Memorandum of Conversation

SVE/MC-7

DATE: February 4, 1959

3:00 p.m. Time:

Place: Emb.Residence, London

SUBJECT:

German Atomic Question

The Secretary General Norstad

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Whitney

Mr. Merchant Mr. Barbour Mr. Greene Mr. Thurston. Mr. Hillenbrand


COPIES TO:

s/s - 2	L
W	S/AE
G	EUR
C	Amembassy Bonn
C S/P	Paris for USRO
ਧ	

General Norstad said there was one German fighter bomber squadron which we had trained and which had stockpile facilities at the site, but as yet had no weapons. There was also an American custodial unitat the site. Chancellor Adenauer had informed Ambassador Bruce that he wanted to have nuclear weapons stored at the site. Legally, Norstad says he could move the weapons into place but not so inform the Germans until there was an agreement under Section 144b of the Act as well as a separate stockpile agreement. The Secretary asked whether anyone would find out about such storage. General Norstad said this would inevitably leak out, but in such a way that the law would not deliberately be violated.

As to IRBMs for Germany, General Norstad commented that this subject was dead. Defense Minister Strauss had not raised it again after word had been sent to Blankenhorn that these missiles could not be provided.

(Diafting Office and Officer)



Memorandum of Conversation

SVE/MC-6

DATE: February 4, 1959

3:00 p.m. Time:

Place: Emb.Residence, London

SUBJECT:

Atomic Stockpile; Atomic Submarine

The Secretary

General Norstad

PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Whitney

Mr. Merchant

Mr. Barbour

Mr. Greene

Mr. Thurston

Mr. Hillenbrand

COPIES TO:

S/AE s/s - 2EUR W G L Paris for Embassy C and USRO H S/P

General Norstad said a good part of the defense in the European area is dependent on the ability to deliver atomic weapons. Nine U.S., air squadrons are based in Eastern France. They do not have such weapons because of French recalcitrance. General Norstad said he could only wait until April 1, after which he would have to make other arrangements. He had stressed the urgency of the matter to Debre, who indicated he would discuss it further upon Norstad's return. The nine squadrons were each worth 10 million dollars per year in terms of local expenditure on the French economy. Should General de Gaulle raise the subject with the Secretary, General Norstad suggested that he follow the line that this was an involved technical matter which was being worked on by our Embassy.

The Secretary noted that the question of having an atomic reactor for a French submarine might arise. Senator Anderson apparently was insisting that before he would agree, the FBI would have to investigate the French Navy. General Norstad recommended that we go ahead with this, but it would be difficult unless the French cooperate in general.

0 4.8/110R.Oh1

SVE/MC-8

DATE: February 4, 1959

Time: 3:00 p.m.

Place: Emb.Residence, London

SUBJECT:

IRBMs for Greece and Turkey

The Secretary

General Norstad

PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Whitney

Mr. Merchant

Mr. Barbour

Mr. Greene

Mr. Thurston

Mr. Hillenbrand

COPIES TO:

s/s - 2 W G	s/ae eur ra	Amembassy Athens Amembassy Ankara Paris for USRO	thorn for Gelf of Ment
C	INR		, , ,
H	NEA	- 1 h	1 / 60
s/P	L	Dust Made	2/12/59 Ju

The Secretary said that General Norstad should know that some people in the State Department were opposed to IRBMs for Greece and Turkey. General Norstad commented that a year ago, a discussion had occurred in the Pentagon on a system of priorities. Mr. Murphy, representing the State Department, agreed that Turkey could be first. General Norstad said the recent developments had placed him in a difficult position. He had practically announced at the NATO meeting in December that the Turks were going to get IRBMs. were now upset. We were stalling them off, claiming that technical and budgetary problems were presenting difficulties. As to the Greeks, the Secretary noted, our impression is that they are not pressing the matter at this time for political reasons. Mr. Thurston added that this was the case principally because of the municipal elections in March. General Norstad said that, if people were worried about the Turks misusing IRBMs, we could drag out indefinitely arrangements under which we would have to keep U. S. personnel present and eliminate thereby any such theoretical risk. The Turks were obviously not ready to move into any situation of full control over the IRBMs immediately.

In response to a remark that some opposed the IRBM program, arguing that it was actually an anti-deterrent rather than a deterrent, General Norstad said it would have positive psychological effects in both Europe and the United States. His own attitude on the military aspect was evidenced by his willingness to

reduce

STOP SECRET

7270R

3 111.5011/2,439

- 2 -

reduce the original proposal of six squadrons to four; but he felt that we should go ahead with the four (ex the UK). He noted that, when he had mentioned the subject of second-generation IRBMs in the presence of Ambassador Blankenhorn, the latter had indulged in an emotional outburst to the effect that the Americans were now pulling out of Europe. The IRBM was obviously not an ultimate weapon, but its introduction into Europe would establish a pattern for a system which could be further developed. As a matter of fact an IRBM in Europe was better than an ICBM in the United States as a military weapon.

There was some discussion of the Italian situation as it affected the capacity of a caretaker government to sign the IRBM agreement. Mr. Thurston noted that the issue was essentially not a legal but a political one.

SVE/MC-9

DATE: February 4, 1959

Time: 3:00 p.m.

Place: Emb.Residence, London

SUBJECT:

Berlin

The Secretary

General Norstad

PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Whitney

Mr. Merchant Mr. Barbour

Mr. Greene Mr. Thurston Mr. Hillenbrand

COPIES TO:

s/s - 2 W

G C

C S/P L Amembassy Bonn

Downgraded To:

EO 11652:

Paris for USRO

USBER

.

Amembassy London

Amembassy Moscow

The discussion of this subject started with a reference to the American convoy which was being held at the Marienborn checkpoint. General Norstad remarked that there was some reason for believing that a local Soviet interpretation of the inspection procedure was involved. The Secretary said that another interpretation might be that the Soviets wanted to stiffen up their position to create a precedent before turning over to the GDR. General Norstad said this would be more likely if it had occurred at the Berlin end of the autobahn. In response to Mr. Merchant's query, General Norstad explained that Plan 103, to which reference had been made in a USAREUR message related to two small U. S. task forces. The first was a group of five light tanks (the A force) in West Germany. The second force was a reinforcement battalion of infantry with some 700 to 800 men. The A force could probably get to the border-crossing point in some 12 hours. It was now in a state of readiness. General Norstad noted that, while there were no substantial Soviet forces in the immediate vicinity of the checkpoint, they had enough strength in the area to cause trouble.

5. 5.00

72710

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

991040-41

0221/2.459